Is Russia’s naval base in Sudan a signal to Turkey ... and Biden?

Is Russia’s naval base in Sudan a signal to Turkey ... and Biden?

Anton Mardasov, Al-Monitor,19/11/20

Moscow is set to create a strategic foothold in Africa along vital shipping routes.

Russian President Vladimir Putin approved on Nov. 16 the government’s plans to create a naval facility in Sudan to service the needs of the Russian navy in the region and serve as a logistics center. The Russian Defense Ministry signed the respective agreement on the facility construction with Khartoum. Given the character of Russian authorities’ decision-making, most experts believe the decision concerning the establishment of the facility had been taken long before its formal announcement. The question, then, is the pace of the facility’s construction, something that will largely depend on the Kremlin’s priorities moving forward. And there are factors that can prompt one to be at least somewhat doubtful as to whether Russia is really all that serious about expanding its footprint in the region.

The first factor in this context is Russia’s constrained economic, military and logistical capabilities. According to the former chief of staff of the Russian navy, retired Adm. Viktor Kravchenko, the most primitive facility in the Red Sea will take three to four months to be completed.

As already noted by Al-Monitor, no concrete details of Russia’s presence in the Red Sea have been divulged so far. More to the point, we do not yet know what sort of base Russia would like to establish in Port Sudan. For example, the Soviet-era logistical facility in Vietnam had in reality served as a proper military base. Does Russia intend to deploy a full-scale facility containing infrastructure for military purposes? Or is this new base just a PR stunt that would merely be comprised of facilities providing occasional service to Russian ships, which are rare in the region anyway? The agreement for easing the passage of Russian ships was reached with Sudan last January, although Moscow has this sort of agreement with many countries — including Nicaragua, a wayward US ally.

There are objective obstacles that may stand in the way of the speedy deployment of the facility. All of the means to protect the base — air defense systems, the tools of electronic warfare together with the infrastructure equipment for social purposes (hospital unit, desalination units) — can be delivered in one of two ways. First, those components can be airlifted to Port Sudan 20 kilometers from the shore by transiting through Khmeimim air base, the route used by the Russian military as an "African hub." The other option is using the sea route. The difficulty, of course, is that Russia does not have many ships for long-distance travel at its disposal, even if we take into account the possibility for those ships to be serviced at Syria’s Russian naval base Tartus.

One expert dealing with the Russian energy sphere, who spoke with Al-Monitor on the condition of anonymity, suggested that a possible choice for the facility’s location may be the least suitable one from the point of view of energy supply. The Sudan facility will be deployed near a city of 600,000 residents that has an oil refinery and the largest dock in the country. At the same time, the city will contain just one diesel and oil-fuelled heat and power plant with a capacity of 337 megawatts. All of this creates problems with powering the facility given that, like the Syrian Khmeimim air base, it would have to be powered by the diesel generators that use fuel that would have to be shipped from Russia. There are not many energy resources in Sudan, and their costs are quite high anyway.

Furthermore, the point in the agreement that allows Russia to station four of its ships — including nuclear-powered ones — at the facility may all sound very well in theory. In practice, though, the Port Sudan infrastructure and the Red Sea in general are not well-equipped for mooring and servicing nuclear-powered submarines. The Iranians use diesel-electric submarines, while the Chinese are perhaps the only ones in Djibouti prepared to conduct large-scale bottom-dredging operations. Meanwhile, the Russian surface vessels with nuclear power units do not carry cruise missiles of the Kalibr type that Russian experts believe will frighten other regional players.

As noted by the head of the Center for International Security at the Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Alexey Arbatov, the boost of Russia’s prestige in the region may incur additional costs, even if one accounts for the possibility of expanding Russia’s gold-mining operations in the country. On top of it all, Moscow will have to be mindful of the potential risk of political instability in Sudan, given the potential for a large-scale conflict to break out in the country.

The second factor one needs to keep in mind when reflecting on Russia’s ambitions in the region is competition with other players. China in particular has been expanding its footprint in the region and has brought its One Belt, One Road project to African countries. While the Kremlin may think that competition is a positive development and engaging in it can enhance Russia’s global standing, there are certain dangers arising from that competition.

Russian radical patriotic media already suggested that the naval base in Sudan is but an anti-Turkish step. Seen from this perspective, Russia came forth in its decision to establish the naval facility, while Ankara is still struggling to regain its influence following the deposal of Omar al-Bashir. As a result, Turkey has not been able to establish its own naval base in the country, not least because of Khartoum’s growing ties with the United Arab Emirates and Egypt following the revolution. Had Turkey established the facility, it would have helped it to project its power more effectively in conjunction with Turkish facilities in Qatar and Somalia. Turkey’s official position has been to dismiss any reports coming from the Gulf countries suggesting Ankara has military plans in Sudan. The agreement concerning the reconstruction of the Suakin port, Turkey authorities claimed, was aimed at turning the island into a tourist attraction, especially for hajj pilgrims. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs continues to claim that negotiations on the seaport have not broken down, and the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency is continuing to restore Ottoman-era artifacts left on the island.

Now, there is a precedent for Russia to take an anti-Turkish stance in political disputes and even side with the anti-Turkish blocs in the region. One case in point is Libya, where Russia lent support to strongman Khalifa Hifter, who has ties to Egypt, the UAE and Saudi Arabia. And even if those actions by Moscow did not lead to serious adverse consequences in relations with Ankara, the Turkish factor can be a variable in shaping Russia’s behavior, at least to an extent. Indeed, some experts suggest in private conversations they do not rule out that the phrase in the agreement saying the “Sudanese side may itself use the facility for mooring the Russian navy” — if it is granted such access by Moscow — can mean that the facility may also be used by warships of other foreign powers; for example, Egypt.

Moreover, Port Sudan is situated opposite Mecca in Saudi Arabia. From this standpoint, Russia’s actions can be easily construed as destabilizing, especially given that, as some experts predict, Russia may deploy the reconnaissance assets in the facility as well as special forces and private military companies. Notably, Russian mercenaries are already present in Sudan, and their numbers will likely increase further.

Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, Sudan’s grievances against the actions of Donald Trump’s administration also play a role. The idea of building the Russian facility on the Red Sea gained traction at the time when Trump first promised to remove Sudan from the list of a state sponsor of terrorism, but then extended the national emergency with respect to Sudan for a year after Khartoum made concessions in the form of paying out compensations to the victims of terrorist attacks and agreed to normalize relations with Israel.

It is thus logical to assume that the Sudanese may in the future be ready to use its ties with Russia as a currency in relations with the United States if the Joe Biden administration agrees to lift the existing sanctions. Sudan may possibly decide to walk back on its decision on the military base, even despite Khartoum’s interest in receiving military equipment from Russia.

At any rate, any Russian activity abroad comes down to the desire to demonstrate its strength vis-a-vis the United States. Biden’s team cannot avoid the topic of relations with Sudan. At the very least, it will have to try and induce Arab countries into normalizing ties with Israel, something a new US administration would likely construe as not just the product of Trump’s administration but a long-term process. Hence, the question becomes whether or not Moscow, like Sudan, is ready to use its new base as a currency in international politics.

“This is the time to restore our navy presence,” said Vladimir Komoedov, a retired Russian admiral and former commander of the Black Sea Fleet, commenting on the news of the facility construction. He said the facility will be another one of Russia’s installations deployed against the background of the supremacy of the United States and NATO in the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian oceans, as well as in the air, at sea and underwater."

Russia to Build Naval Base in Sudan

 Pavel Felgenhauer, EDM 19/1/20
 
President Vladimir Putin issued a decree authorizing Russia’s Ministry of Defense to sign an agreement with Sudan to create a permanent Russian military base, or “naval supply station” (punkt materialno-tekhnicheskogo snabzenya). The location of the new naval facility will be close to the main Sudanese trading port—Port Sudan—where several patrol boats that comprise the Sudanese Navy are also based. The basing agreement will last 25 years, with a possible prolongation for another decade, with mutual consent. The Russian naval garrison will be some 300 strong, with armed guards to provide security. All locally stationed Russian personnel will enjoy full diplomatic exterritorial immunity. The base will be able to berth up to four warships, “including nuclear-powered vessels.” Russia will not pay the Sudanese authorities any rent, but it has apparently agreed to ship pro bono some military supplies and weapons to Sudan under a separate, additional agreement. Moscow will organize and pay for construction work to establish the base, including living quarters, warehouses, naval maintenance facilities and docks. Moreover, Russia will provide anti-aircraft defenses to cover both its own base and the nearby Sudanese naval assets in Port Sudan. The draft agreement makes no mention of any Russian airbase in Sudan in addition to the announced naval supply station, but Russian aircraft will apparently be allowed to use Sudanese airspace. A large international airport is situated south of Port Sudan, and Moscow might be allowed to utilize it. The number of Russian military personnel in Sudan may be increased above the initial 300, according to the draft agreement (Interfax, November 16).
 
During the Cold War, the Russian military and navy were present in South Yemen, at the entrance to the Red Sea, when this former British colony was ruled by a Marxist regime. Moreover, Russian troops under the guise of military advisors were deployed in Ethiopia when that country had a Marxist regime. The Russian military in Ethiopia was engaged in fighting anti-government rebels, primarily Tigrayans, and independence-seeking insurgents in Eritrea. Russian naval ships were deployed on the Red Sea coast of Eritrea (then part of Ethiopia) and were involved in fighting the rebels. By 1991, as the Cold War and the Soviet Union were coming to an end, the Ethiopian regime collapsed, Eritrea gained independence, and the Russians withdrew from the region. Russia had withdrawn from South Yemen before, as that country sank into a bloody civil war. Now, Moscow is back, establishing a military foothold in a region it sees as strategically important (Novaya Gazeta, November 19).
 
In recent years, Moscow been extending its influence across Africa; but the base in Sudan is naval, so it is more about projecting force beyond the continent into the maritime shipping lanes of the Red Sea connecting Asia and Europe, the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea, the Gulf and the Indian Ocean. The United States maintains a strategically important base on the British overseas territory of Diego Garcia Island (Indian Ocean). And the 5th US Fleet has its home base in Manama, Bahrain. The headquarters of US Central Command (USCC) and US Air Force Central Command (USAFCC) are at the al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar. US carrier strike groups travel in and out of the Suez Canal and through the Red Sea from bases on the United States’ East Coast to the Gulf region and back again. Sometimes US ships launch cruise missiles and aerial attacks against Middle Eastern targets directly from the Red Sea, which has been considered relatively safe up to now. According to Russian military experts, the new base in Sudan will be a welcome extension to the existing Russian naval and air bases in Syria that have now been extended to house “tens of warships, [and] provide maintenance and supplies together with air support,” according to Russia’s defense minister, Army General Sergei Shoigu (Interfax, November 17).
 
The draft agreement with Sudan mentions the possible presence of nuclear-powered warships, but the only Russian surface nuclear-power ship today is the Pyotr Velikiy (Kirov class), which, apparently, is not fully operational. The vessel has not recently been deployed out of the Barents Sea as it awaits its sister nuclear cruiser, the Admiral Nakhimov, to finish a lengthy and costly refurbishment (remont) in Severodvinsk. After the Nakhimov finishes its remont and is operational, the Pyotr Velikiy is apparently scheduled to take its place to undergo a remont in turn. The plan to begin building (before the end of 2020) Lider-class nuclear powered super-destroyers of up to 20,000-ton displacement, armed as heavily as the Kirov-class cruisers, but sleeker and stealthier, has been shelved indefinitely because of lack of money, the low price of oil and the COVID-19 pandemic. No nuclear-powered Russian ships look to be available to be based in Sudan anytime soon (Novaya Gazeta, November 19).
 
Russia has not built any destroyers since the early 1990s, when several Sovremenny-class ships were exported to China. As such, the Russian navy has no operational destroyers left today. Moreover, Russia has had problems equipping new frigates with engines that, prior to 2014, were produced in Ukraine—now a hostile country. Russia has been expanding its naval forces by constructing different types of corvettes and small missile ships. Many of these vessels are equipped with universal vertical 3С-14 launch tubes, allowing them to fire different nuclear-capable anti-ship or long-range Kalibr cruise missiles (see EDM, May 4, 2017, August 1, 2017, July 29, 2020). With a nuclear-tipped missile, a Russian corvette could potentially singlehandedly destroy a US carrier group, or Diego Garcia, or any other strategically important target. Russian admirals are forced to use these small ships as a strategic asset, but in truth, these small ships have limited seaworthiness, weak air defenses, and carry a limited supply of long-range missiles. To pose any credible strategic threat in the Indian Ocean, this Russian mosquito fleet absolutely needs a base in the region to resupply and rearm. It is possible, therefore, that the clause about nuclear-powered ships in the draft basing agreement is actually a cover story to allow Russia to covertly deploy nuclear weapons to the Sudanese base to be put onboard corvettes in a time of crisis (Novaya Gazeta, November 19).